On Accessibility
To have access to something is to have the ability to interact with it in ways this thing implies interaction. Some things have the ability to carry out actions in relation to things without this ability. Consider that water particles present in the air affect things. This makes their ability that of affection in relation to things. We may say then that water has access to a thing by having an effect on it that we may call its ability.
Water is present in the atmosphere of Earth, which makes it have access to every thing where there’s air. This implies that each water particle can interact with every other water particle as well as with all things in the atmosphere. Things cannot initiate interaction themselves, but may be interacted with. Let’s say that this differentiates a subject from an object. But if every subject can interact with objects as well as with subjects, then we may deduce that interaction between one subject and another subject makes a thing a subject. By looking at things, we can’t tell apart subject from object, because in this analysis, we must know it prior to what makes a subject a subject, which is an interaction with the same category. If we inspect the interaction between things, we can’t deduce which thing is an object and which is a subject either, because the direction this movement takes becomes only apparent if we know what makes an object as well as a subject. When we’re looking at effects to deduce access, we may see that subjects affect subjects as well as objects. This tells us that effects are present that lead to the concept of access, without being able to tell whether effects take place between subject and subject or object and subject.
Thus far we’ve laid out the relationship between things. This differentiation of things was carried out by the differentiation of relationships. Things were separated into subjects and objects, while relationships into interaction and ability first, effect and access second. Our aim was to differentiate between things, but we seem to have ended up differentiating the differentiator. To bring more clarity to this thought, we shall say that the differentiation of relationship tried to differentiate a concept (thing) by differentiation. This differentiating operation considered things and relationships as categories of pairs where each affirms the same by belonging in a category. By representing pairs, these affirmations of the same aimed to differentiate what is affirmed, which is the same. If pairs affirm the same, then difference cannot come after, as these pairs express the same together, whereas if difference comes first, then it cannot affirm the same. We shall say that things affirm things and relationships affirm relationships, separate from one another to the effect of tautology. In other words, each category affirms the same. If we make pairs from these categories, they affirm thing-relationships and relationship-things. We may form categories from these affirmations, as third, fourth and nth in comparison to the initial two, and say that these are different from the ones we’ve analyzed previously. Difference thus appears to rise from the analysis rather than what is analyzed.
This brings us to the ground of the old subject-object argument. In our case, analysis creates concepts from objects, subjects and subject-object relations, which considers to affirm the same and difference. Analysis separates the analyst (subject) from what is analyzed (object) that ends up referring to this analysis as an object while calling it a subject, such as human.
Access and accessibility appears to be a particular affirmation of the same through difference, whose object is the human subject. Going by our earlier inquiry, analysis takes access as relationship between subject and object. For instance, access to a website that hosts public information or a building for a public institution locates humans as subjects, whereas buildings and websites as objects. By dealing with the public, this analysis looks at itself (as object) by what it considers to be human (subject,) then exclamates what this subject-object should entail, that of human as a sum of people, which is the public. Access in this operation deals with this sum in a way that distributes accessibility to that of equals. It is to create a subject in the form of access that affirms the same in relation to an object (institutions) while analysis creates objects (humans) that affirm the same in relation to access. By making sure every human has equal access to institutions, analysis relates one object to another object from which relation a third object arises in the form of access. It appears that we’re left without any subject, as it appears to fall outside the system that provides equal access, while these objects insist on producing and distributing notions of equality between subjects.
The human subject in this sense can only appear as the same in relation to access through analysis, while purporting such relation with institutions with which it has none. Because institutions deal with the constituents of the human subject, that is, with persons, who appear as the same in relation to other persons, that is, as equal objects. An analysis completes this operation of equality between persons, all the while calling this affirmation of the same as access that is supposed to carry this out through institutions, even though these institutions affirm the same only through access. This yields us institutions that affirm difference for their person objects outside of access, while analysis calls this difference the same in the form of access. The former refers to the constituents of the human subject by way of persons, while the latter to its entirety by way of the public, all the while both referents place the human subject as object. It’s a relationship that constitutes no human nor subject that repeatedly refers to both human and subject when laid out by analysis which considers itself as both subject and object.
