On Finitude

Consider everything that includes every thing. Looking at it from the present, we may conclude that it does include every thing. If it is true at every present moment, then it must include moments we looked at to see if every thing is included. In other words, everything must include itself in every thing. If it doesn’t need to consider its own inclusion in every thing, then by knowing it as such, we cannot talk about everything but one thing as it is everything.

By including its consideration of whether itself is included in every thing, it must take account of each consideration of itself. The origin of everything thus cannot start with itself as it is the result of consideration, while consideration cannot take place without a self. This doesn’t exclude the possibility of everything, but its linear construction from itself by consideration in its inception. This makes everything contingent on an idea of origin, which is yet again, one thing.

Let’s circle back to the idea of a series consisting of a self and consideration that produces self-considerations. If this is the case, then consideration must look at these series of self-considerations and preceding selves for the inclusion of every thing. It may derive the idea of finitude from this series. But if this is the case, then from the linear series of things, it must conclude the possibility of infinitude. That is, the place it looks from (present) designates the number of aforementioned conceptions in the series (of self-considerations.) Looking at the past, it may count these self-considerations, and find them finite, while looking at the other way, that is, the future, its counting will never stop until finitude is considered that produces the idea of infinitude. But this production of infinitude excludes the possibility of counting every thing in a series of considerations, excluding everything to contain every thing.