Popular Art Criticism
What is criticism’s raison d’être? To criticize. Criticism’s purpose then is to criticize, we propose by saying this. It may criticize everything and anything. But going by this reasoning, we cannot distinguish criticism from utterance, as it can also refer to everything and anything. To be able to refer to everything, the referent must consider its own reference in all manner, such as during the utterance of words that refer, that it cannot do, since it utters words that refer to something other than this utterance. We may describe this example of utterance in relation to speech that’s constrained by the material conditions of the speaker who cannot utter words on top of words. We may point at the structure of language that formalizes the material properties into a system that delineates speech. Or refer to a place where words are uttered, such as in time, where utterance takes place before reference. From these examples, we shall say that the material conditions of the speaker are systemized in a way that the word referring to ideas conveys something other than what is uttered.
To criticize, then, is to refer to something in a systemic manner considered critical. This consideration that determines whether the utterance adheres to its designated rules can only take place after the utterance. It reflects on what this utterance conveys and modifies it afterwards according to the designated system’s formula. It is similar to utterance in a way that it conveys something other than what the formula dictates. How can we know that our criticism is commensurate with its systemic rules if we can only ensure that it is so after its location in relation to said formula?
If criticism is like an utterance that it conveys something different than it means to, then it’ll always remain incommensurate. Otherwise, it depends on the commensurability of the system where criticism is located. To carry this out, criticism must be evaluated whether it measures up to the system’s requirements as criticism, as well as this evaluation to the requirement of evaluation. The latter must differ from the former, since it evaluates evaluation, while the former deals with criticism. But this seriality cannot ensure that evaluation’s evaluation and the latter’s evaluation is correct, because another evaluation must follow it.
Another criteria must enter the system that systemizes commensurability in a systemic way. This system must consider each combination of utterance, including the ones that haven’t been uttered yet, while being able to reevaluate its systemic rules that enclose. We’re describing a series of additions ad infinitum, where each element must be commensurate according to criterias that are not yet known, and once they’ve become known, the system and its evaluations be reevaluated to commensurability. But then we’re describing a system in constant motion, shifting and changing, where each utterance can only be comprehended according to criterias specific to an evaluation, that is, criticism adherent to the structure of utterance.
Again, we may raise the linear notion of spatiotemporality to say that once an utterance has been modified, it cannot convey its prior conveyance afterwards. But if utterance is defined, that is, limited by the material conditions of speech, then so is criticism if it falls under the category of utterance. The same can be said about a piece of art, a notion of populus, or any idea, if we consider them as systems that convey ideas.
We’ve looked at utterance and criticism, notions of art and populus as concepts that convey ideas by enclosure, where closure appears to have been the operating principle by showing what it lacks (enclosure) as well as what it contains (disclosure.) By looking at utterance, we’ve disclosed its aim (reference) and constraints (material,) where this double-movement creates concepts (closed) and ideas (open,) which are then synthesized to notions of transcendence that enclose and disclose an open as well as closed system.
