Same Difference

1. By saying that “something is,” one refers to some parts of a thing to affirm that it is. This affirmation is always true when parts refer to the same parts, that is to say “something is something.” It is to affirm a whole thing as truth. Shouting “Fire!” accompanied by pointing is to affirm that the thing one points at is fire. But one doesn’t say this to refer to fire as a whole thing, nor to affirm the wholeness of this claim’s truth, but to alert about the dangers of fire. By uttering “Fire!” and pointing at a thing, one affirms danger, that is to say fire is danger. This thing is not that other thing, but smoke, heat and such parts, of fire, which are like danger. The utterance affirms likeness of parts as a whole, that is, truth.

2. Now, consider that one shouts “Danger!” instead of “Fire!” while pointing at a fire. It can refer to the same parts of fire to say that its heat thing is like a danger thing. A whole thing is affirmed by fire, danger and truth, even though these parts referring to one another are different in fire, danger and truth. A fire’s part can only be the same in the same fire, or with a fire identical to it. Whether this is possible with fire, or with anything else in an ordinary understanding of space and time, is of no importance to us right now. What we’re interested in are statements that affirm truth in their wholeness by referring to parts that are the same or like one another, but reveal themselves to be neither. Fire and danger have no resemblance but only in perception that’s unclear about which parts of fire and danger refer to one another. The referent appears to establish likeness between parts while referring to wholes with fire and danger.

3. This puzzle is no short task to untangle. What we should focus on, for now, is whether truth statements are possible if we consider them to be affirmations of wholes consisting of ambiguous parts. The statement of “something is something” affirms that a reference is present by saying that it is. It stands between things it refers to that brings them to the affirmation’s present. That is to say, the referent and things come forth as a whole. They are. If we consider them to be present, these things become connected to the present in some way by the referent, and if we consider these to exist, then the referent connects them to existence. The referent affirms that things are present and exist as a whole, and that itself is. The referent becomes existence-like and present-like by affirming a whole. By affirming itself as well with is, does this make things referent-like and the reference thing-like?

4. We may consider the order of things and references, and what precedes these in this Wittgensteinian line of thinking. But our concern is whether these affirmations are capable of expressing truth in their wholeness, if affirmation itself is referent-like, and if things and referents are existence-like and present-like. This whole seems to affirm likeness, existence, the present and affirmation itself. Perhaps these loose metaphysical categories are inadequate for looking at truth as a whole. If we get rid of them, then affirmation itself and of likeness remain. One thing is like another, the referent affirms. In affirming likeness between one thing and another by is, affirmation also refers to itself with it, that is, by likeness between things. To affirm affirmation itself is then to refer by likeness to things and the referent that affirms. It is to self-affirm as likeness of things that affirms thing-likeness and affirmation-likeness. This makes the referent thing-like and the things referent-like in such a whole. Is it to affirm ambiguous likeness?

5. To say likeness is to operate with notions of difference, sameness and resemblance. But since no thing is the same as another, it is to affirm difference and resemblance, even though the utterance of “something is (like) another thing” expresses the same. As if the omission of the referent’s likeness affirms difference that is the same. The same as what? The same as likeness that affirms difference by the similar and the similar by difference. That is, to affirm the referent itself as likeness, as well as thing-likeness and referent-likeness. It affirms resemblance and similarity, which refer to the resemblatory and the similar by difference. This conception of difference seems inadequate, since it appears to refer back to itself, as referent-affirmation and affirmation-referent that are rendered the same in the whole.

6. Let’s consider a machine capable of creating things that are the same. Say that a line of code run by a computer visualizes a fire on a screen. By running this code twice, two fires appear that are the same. If these overlay one another on the screen, then we only see one fire, whereas if these same fires are visualized next to each other, then they aren’t the same as the one before them. What if two fires are visualized on two screens that are manufactured the same way? The computer runs the same code twice on screens that are the same. The visualization of fires are the same, but the screens displaying them may differ by a manufacturing error. Consider that these are eliminated, in which case the two visualizations of fire are the same that differ from the visualization before them, because now we have two screens displaying the same fire. The fire is inseparable from the thingness of screen in this example.

7. But now we have two wholes, one with one screen visualizing fire, the other with two. Nevertheless, the fire is inseparable in each case from the thingness of the screen and the kindness of the code. Then what is fire in this instance? A referent that points at the code and the screen, by which it is code-like and thing-like.

8. The code is the origin of this visualization of fire, but it isn’t fire which is the origin of code, even though this is what’s visualized on the screen. Furthermore, by seamlessly rendering the fire’s visuals, the order of its appearance is rendered without origin or end. Fire appears depending on the thingness of the screen, that is, a part of fire (its visuals) to affirm a whole (as fire.) A fire is affirmed that’s code-like, thing-like and fire-like without difference or similarity between these likenesses. That is to say, there’s no common denominator between fire, code and the screen, even though we might be inclined to say that the screen is (like) fire and vice versa, say, after encountering these together several times.

9. Now that we see that there’s no difference, resemblance or similarity to speak of when looking at this likeness, then what is fire but a combustion of parts coming forth as heat and colors? That is, parts of a thing go through transformation and are transformed by perception and language. Naming these changes a thing goes through and are put through, as transformation, only makes sense from the point of view of difference that differentiates, but in different ways, which differences are rendered the same by naming them as transformation. We may be falling victim to the differentiating referent whose difference is rendered the same by affirming a whole. That is, by using transformation as the referent is, we can see that it affirms itself as affirmation-referent and referent-affirmation, which are rendered the same in the whole. But this doesn’t give us a full picture of transformation, because transformation refers by naming that’s transforming to transformation. In this sense, transformation doesn’t affirm itself, but it is affirmed by naming that refers back to it as is. To name is to point as part of referring, which leads us back to the similar in this fire as a whole.

10. Let’s consider the visualization of fire on screen one more time. Upon a closer look, we’d likely find similarities between parts of the fire. Flame shapes would appear similar, that turn out looking exactly the same upon inspecting the code that does the rendering. Affirmations of similarity and resemblance about this fire on screen becomes redundant once code enters the picture, because it can only affirm the same in parts of the flame that make the whole of fire. That is, uttering “screen is fire” is to affirm that parts of code render identical shapes until it visualizes fire on the screen. These shapes form the whole of fire by addition. As if code refers to screen and fire to affirm quantitative difference by saying that this rendering is. Does this make fire and screen code-like and not vice versa, even though we’ve established it earlier that this visualization’s origin has no bearing on the affirmation, because fire’s seamless rendering negates the possibility for common denominator between fire, screen and code?

11. As if code’s affirmation of itself as the same makes referencing only possible between these same parts as self-reference which make the whole. It is to affirm code itself as truth by this circular argument. We shall look at this in a quantitative context, such as the operation of addition we brought up earlier. A visualization of fire on screen consists of two renderings on either one or two screens. They aren’t different in forming a whole that affirms that it is. This visualization of fire is true in any combination. The operation of addition allows to form wholes from parts, such as two screens visualizing fire. The addition of two fire renderings make a whole from parts that are wholes by being the same. By affirming a whole from wholes is to add one plus one that equals one. Indeed, saying “fire is fire” is to affirm fire itself, a whole as truth from two wholes. It is to affirm the same. Executing a code that affirms zero must render zero, that is, itself, which is true with executing one to render one and any combination of them, that fails to render anything if the code doesn’t affirm itself.

12. Parts of the rendering of fire, such as flames and smoke, are part of the whole and form wholes themselves only if their code is capable of rendering them as themselves, because to render code is to affirm code itself. That is, they can’t affirm the truth as whole unless they can be rendered as flame or smoke as a whole.

13. In this line of thinking, it is code that is executed and renders by reference to affirm itself. Does the reference of is affirms itself as well? It does by pointing that differs from code by the ambiguity of our finger, which won’t cease to render reference-like configurations of pointing as long as it can point.